



















An apparent temporary narrowing of income inequality has been observed 
during several recent banking crises.  But it would be a mistake to conclude 
that such crises don’t matter for the poor.  For one thing, the correlation is not 
strong, and the opposite pattern has also been present.  Besides, the poor are 
much less able to absorb a cut in income: safety-net policies are urgent during 
a downturn even if the gap between rich and poor has temporarily narrowed.  
More fundamentally, distributional shifts during the crisis itself may be less 
important than the fact that underlying financial policy and infrastructures 
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Financial sector crises are often especially damaging to the poor, derailing education and 
preventive health-care and setting back the development process.  In addition, elite 
groups at the top of the income and wealth distribution often escape the worst of the 
crisis, by exporting capital ahead of the crash and seeing their debts written off.  On the 
other hand, some have noted cases where inequality has narrowed, for example where 
higher income groups with closer ties to formal finance suffer when banks fail. 
 
So which is it: does a pro-poor financial sector policy need to pay special attention to 
financial sector crises, or are they more a matter of concern to higher income groups?  
This policy question is more complex than might at first appear: it has both short-term 
and long-term aspects.  
 
Though confirming that measured income inequality has narrowed in the immediate 
aftermath of several banking crises, this note dismisses any implication that such crises 
are unimportant for anti-poverty policy.  The ultimate causes of crises vary, and each 
different causal path may be expected to have different consequences for poverty.   
 
If the crisis is accompanied by a general economic downturn – which is not always the 
case –  there will be an increase in poverty.  But the short-run impact of the breaking of a 
crisis can often be associated with an improvement in inequality as the higher income 
groups temporarily experience disproportionate losses of income.  After all, many of the 
syndromes that lead to major or repeated financial sector crises are logically associated 
with more unequal societies: systemic failure can undermine the privileges that have been 
built in.  Of course, it is cold comfort for the poor when a general economic downturn 
reduces the income of the rich by even more: focusing on (relative) inequality can be 
misleading in such circumstances if our concern is for the welfare of the poor.   
 
When the crisis hits, the consequences for the income level of different groups depends 
on the economy’s capacity to absorb shocks, a capacity which is certainly influenced by 
the effectiveness of financial structures, but which is also strongly influenced by, for 
example, the flexibility of labor markets.  Safety net policies and the government’s 
willingness and capacity to implement, protect and adapt such policies is also a crucial 
determinant of the distributional fall-out of a crisis.   
 
In the longer run, if the crisis leads to a sufficient reconfiguration of power and policies 
as to result in a more effective and more growth and equality-promoting financial system, 
the long-run position of the poor could be greatly improved.   On the other hand, there 
could be long-lasting adverse effects of the shock on escape-from-poverty probabilities. 
  
The growing professional interest in measuring distributional changes worldwide and the 
growing availability of data make it possible to attempt a quantitative approach to 
understanding these issues, even though the precision of available data is not high, and 
even though making comparisons between successive survey-based inequality estimates 
is made hazardous by the likely size of random measurement error.  In this context, it 
should be noted that measuring the overall economic costs of banking crises has proved   2
to be particularly difficult and controversial.  No such measures command general assent 
among scholars, and therefore there is no secure foundation for going the further step of 
assessing distributional consequences. 
 
Although, as will become evident, individual crises have been analyzed in detail, cross-
country empirical studies of distributional aspects of banking crises per se have been 
scarce.  Most of the comparative work on crises (for example Lustig, 2000) has had a 
wider scope, including also macroeconomic and currency crises.  Indeed, it is hard to 
disentangle the effects of currency and banking crises which often coincide.  An 
exception is Halac and Schmukler’s important (2004) paper which specifically focuses on 
the financial sector channel. 
 
In addition to exploring these issues at a conceptual level (Section 2), this paper reviews 
some of the empirical evidence on these issues. Documented cases from each continent 
where inequality has declined are reviewed in Section 3; the case of Indonesia in some 
detail in the Annex.  Cross-country evidence is marshaled in Section 4: systematic and 
robust regression relationships remain elusive, likely the consequence not only of the 
conceptual complexity but also of what proves to be still a small and problematic 
database.  Section 5 draws some policy conclusions. 
  
2.  Crises and their channels of impact on inequality 
In considering the policy implications of financial crises it is important to bear in mind 
that the crisis itself not a policy tool to be turned on or off: the frequency, severity and 
timing of financial sector crises are the outcome of the interaction of various forces, 
including prior policies and institutional structures, as well the incidence of exogenous 
shocks.  In searching for relevant policy lessons, we need to distinguish between these 
forces, and focus on the causal factors that may be subject to policy action. 
 
This section looks at three conceptual issues.  We begin (Section 2.1) by clarifying the 
scope of the inquiry and explaining why the focus of the paper is on banking crises rather 
than on economic and financial crises more generally.  Section 2.2 discusses the 
inadequacy of relative inequality measures for judging the welfare impact on the poor, 
both in the short- and the long-term.  Section 2.3 reviews the different channels through 
which a crisis may affect inequality and the poor, observing that a channel-by-channel 
analysis needs to be complemented by an overall macro view.   
 
2.1  Banking and other financial crises 
This paper is largely about banking crises, excluding many wider events that are often 
included under the heading of financial crises.  The latter term is often used in a very 
broad sense to include the abandonment of an exchange rate peg or other sharp exchange 
rate movements, sharp movements in stock prices or in interest rates, and the associated 
macroeconomic turbulence.  For those focused on Latin America, the distinction may 
seem academic.  But taking a wider global view, banking systems have survived many 
currency and macroeconomic crises without systemic failure.   
   3
To be sure, almost any shock of macroeconomic importance, including non-economic 
shocks (such as earthquakes and hurricanes) will tend to reflected in some financial asset 
prices.
1 But these financial asset price movements can be thought of as having the 
function of transmitting and absorbing these shocks.  Large asset price movements may 
reflect effective financial market functioning – not failure.  But a severe shock may result 
in even larger asset price movements associated with financial market failures, as when 
technical or information failures make prices deviate from a rational expectations 
equilibrium.  Events even in advanced markets such as the October 1987 New York stock 
market event or the dot.com bubble (perhaps most dramatically exemplified by the 
collapse of the German Neuer Markt in 2000-1) are cases in point.  Distinguishing such 
asset-pricing market failures from rational market movements is highly problematic and 
controversial, however.   
 
Short of entering this controversy, the researcher is faced with the choice of either 
analyzing all assets involving financial asset turbulence or narrowing the focus 
considerably.  Clearly, if we were to count as financial crises all large events that are 
accompanied by financial asset price movements, we would widen the scope of the study 
to all economic crises, thereby losing the intended focus.  Other studies of the poverty 
and inequality impact of crises have chosen different dimensions of crisis: for example, 
Baldacci et al. (2002), define crisis as a large exchange rate depreciation, following 
Frankel and Rose (1996). Lustig’s  influential (2000) review of Latin American 
experience is also based on a wider crisis concept. 
 
Instead, the present paper focuses more narrowly on failures in the functioning of 
financial sector intermediaries, primarily banks, in the hope of identifying more precise 
conclusions.  Thus we focus on situations where financial intermediaries suddenly fail to 
perform their normal functions: depositors are unable to access their funds,
2 or if they are, 
it is only because of exceptional steps taken by the central bank or other monetary 
authorities.  Wholesale or retail payment instructions fail to be delivered.  Credit flows 
dry up and facilities cannot be renewed.  Equities cannot be sold promptly on the 
organized market.   Note that isolated failures of particular institutions do not add up to a 
systemic financial crisis unless these institutions count for a sizable fraction of the market 
– not less than 10 percent, say.   
 
                                                 
1 To a degree, this depends on the degree of development of financial asset markets.  If the shock in 
question has macroeconomic importance, it will likely affect the equilibrium real exchange rate, profit 
flows for important sectors and the ability and willingness of the government to finance its spending plans 
without reliance on the inflation tax and the nominal interest rate required to achieve the monetary 
authorities’ goals.  In an economy with extensive traded securities, the prices of various financial assets 
will embody the market’s evaluation of a stream of future payments which will be sensitive to these 
consequences of the shock.  Where markets are less well-developed, it is even possible that price 
movements for the assets that are traded will be even larger. 
2 Or policyholders find that insurers are unable to meet the contingencies envisaged in the policies.  
Although there have been a number of large insurance company failures worldwide, insurance is so much 
smaller than banking in almost all countries that insurance has not been at the centre of any of the financial 
crises conventionally regarded as systemic.   4
Banking crises in this sense can be triggered by external shocks, and in extreme cases 
(such as the Argentine event of December 2001) may in fact be caused by the shocks.  
However, the experience of many countries shows that banking systems that are well-
capitalized and managed can absorb even sizable external shocks.  Even when triggered 
by exogenous shocks, we should regard most systemic banking crises as having financial 
sector policy causes.   
 
Most commonly, then, it is latent weakness in financial sector policies and institutions 
that is uncovered by the economic downturn associated with an adverse shock, and its 
revelation can lead, through credit, confidence or other channels, to a deepening of the 
downturn itself.  If financial system policies and structures had been more robust, they 
should have withstood the shock.  Distinguishing the effects of the financial weakness 
per se from those of the non-financial shock is by no means straightforward. How bad 
would things have been if the financial sector had survived the wider adverse shock?  The 
debate on how to measure the economic costs of banking crises remains quite unsettled 
for this precise reason.   
 
2.2  Thinking differently about short-term and long-term effects 
A distinction must be made between medium-term and short-term aspects.   
−  The short term relates to the period immediately surrounding the denouement of 
the crisis.  This is the fast-moving stage that may be accompanied by sharp 
exchange rate, interest rate and stock market movements; a wave of bankruptcies 
of firms, nonfinancial and financial alike; payments system failure; depositor 
panic; bank closures; soaring unemployment; and abrupt shifts in relative prices 
of foodstuffs, and in the purchasing power of wages and pensions.  The short term 
is counted in months or quarters, and will often be played out within two or three 
years.   
−  The medium term embraces the pre-crisis period during which hidden imbalances 
that would cause or exacerbate the crisis are being accumulated.  It also embraces 
the resolution phase when the direct financial costs of the crisis are allocated and 
when the institutional and often political reconfigurations that result from the 
crisis are being put into place.  The duration of the medium term, from pre-crisis 
to resolution, could be as long as a decade or more.  
 
Short-term: even an inequality-reducing economic decline can hit the poor more than 
most 
In the short term, inequality of both income and expenditure often declines.  In the case 
of a generalized economic downturn associated with a financial crisis, while mean 
income typically falls at all deciles,
3 the formal sector of the economy may be hit more 
directly, and wage rates for the high skilled may fall more than most.   
 
                                                 
3 Though not necessarily for all individuals.  There are gainers from the pattern of relative price changes, 
and these may be at all income levels, from smallholder producers of food (if the relative price of food 
climbs during the crisis), to bankruptcy lawyers.   5
But even if measured inequality declines, that is far from implying that financial crises 
are of less concern to the poor.  For one thing, many common measures of inequality are 
insensitive to the disproportionate welfare impact of small income changes on the poor.  
 
Specifically, linear measures of inequality, including the Gini, interquartile range, etc. fail 
to take account of the fact that the poor are less able to absorb income losses.  A linear 
metric of income as welfare is particularly inadequate to approximate the distribution of 
welfare losses when poor people close to subsistence are experiencing sharp declines in 
wage rates and in the price of their produce.  Concerns of this type can be partly 
addressed by considering the allocation of household expenditure among different 
product classes.  They also motivate nonlinear measures such as the Atkinson index and 
poverty headcount, poverty gap and other members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class. 
 
In addition, faced with lower real wage rates, poor people will try to substitute more 
hours of labor to maintain spending power for necessities, so that actual cash income (or 
expenditure) changes will understate the decline in full income and as such in welfare.  
By scrimping on preventive health care, education and other investments, the poor may 
forgo disproportionately large returns on such investment, whether rationally or because 
of information imperfections (not fully understanding the forgone opportunities) or inter-
household issues (the future welfare of children or spouses not fully internalized by the 
household spender). 
 
Because of the nonlinearity of the welfare impact of income decline, aggressive safety net 
measures (such as those discussed in Ferreira et al., 1999, or Manuelyan-Atinc and 
Walton, 1998) are clearly needed to limit the impact on the poor of an economic 
downturn.  As a result, if such policies are effective, income inequalities should narrow in 
the short run; the extent that they do not can be regarded as an indication of the 
inadequacy of the safety net. 
 
Long term: the financial crisis can be the first step towards a more healthy regime 
As for the medium and long term, the question is subtly changed.  From this perspective 
the crisis can be seen as part of a process whereby unsound financial structures and 
policies are exposed, hopefully leading to their resolution on more healthy basis.  If 
recent results showing that financial sector development is correlated with improved 
income distribution are any indication, then this medium-term dialectic should imply a 
gradual post-crisis improvement in income distribution.  That presumes that the 
resolution of the crisis is indeed done on a sustainable and sound basis, which is not 
always the case, as can be seen from the fact that many countries have experienced 
several successive financial crises.   
 
All going well, we would expect an improvement in income distribution from an unsound 
pre-crisis financial sector policy (with, for example, undercapitalized private banks 
lending recklessly to insiders in an under-regulated environment with weak enforcement 
of property rights and deficient information infrastructures, or dysfunctional government 
banks lending in accordance with political directives) to a cleaned-up, well-capitalized 
and contestable system supported by adequate information and legal infrastructures.  All   6
too often, though, crisis resolution will fall short of this ideal, in which case the 
distributional improvements will not be seen either. 
 
Both short and long-term perspectives foresee potential improvements in income 
distribution around financial sector crises, though on different timescales, and depending 
(in the first instance) on the nature of the economic system’s crisis absorption capacity, 
including the safety-net response of government and (in the second instance) on whether 
the crisis does in fact achieve the hoped-for cathartic effect. 
 
2.3   Channels of effect 
Banking crises come in different varieties and with different degrees of severity 
(Honohan, 2000).  Some are resolved without the economy being pitched into a 
macroeconomic recession.  These would include several cases where government-owned 
banks were revealed to have incurred severe losses on their loan portfolio, losses which 
were eventually made good by government recapitalization without an intervening loss of 
confidence by depositors or by the holders of local currency or government debt.  In these 
cases, the costs flow through fiscal channels, affecting the needed balance between tax 
revenues and expenditures which can have distributional consequences as well as 
potentially affect long-term growth rates through the deadweight cost of taxation. 
 
Other banking crises have been associated with major macroeconomic volatility in a way 
which, as mentioned, often defies analysis of causality: economic downturns trigger the 
banking crisis, or its recognition; the scale of the banking losses in turn affects 
confidence and may deepen the recession and drive down the external and internal value 
of the currency.  Here some distributional effects may still come through fiscal channels 
(including the transfer of fiscal resources to persons who are, directly or indirectly, bailed 
out), but there are several additional channels: loss of employment; loss of current and 
prospective business profits; relative price changes, including changes in real wages, 
capital losses and gains on unhedged foreign exchange positions. 
 
Taking stock, then, consider the following checklist of channels through which 
households can be adversely affected by a financial crisis.
4  We rank them in order 
starting with those most closely related to the banking failure itself. 
 
(a)  Loss of deposits in a failed banking institution 
(b)  Loss of employment or earnings directly due to (i) disruption of the payments 
process, (ii) the bankruptcy of financial institutions (for employees and other 
stakeholders of these institutions) or (iii) the interruption of credit flows (for 
borrowing clients with information capital invested in the failed financial 
institutions) 
(c)  Tax increases or curtailment of public spending due to fiscal cost of bail-outs of 
financial firms or their customers 
                                                 
4 Many previous studies provide a similar checklist. The present one is specifically adapted to banking 
crises.   7
(d)  Temporary or permanent changes in relative prices of (i) consumption goods, (ii) 
wage rates, (iii) production goods (iv) asset prices, that arise through knock-on 
effects on the rest of the economy 
(e)  Involuntary unemployment if the crisis leads to a generalized economic downturn. 
 
Some relative price shifts and some changes in fiscal policy resulting from the crisis can 
also benefit some households. For instance, a program of debtor relief may be adopted 
which conveys considerable benefits to debtor households. 
 
Impact on depositors  
Some indications of the distributional implications of the first channel can be calculated 
from surveys of financial assets holdings.  This has been done for four Latin American 
countries by Halac and Schmukler (2004).  For example, in their data the top decile of 
income earners own 36 percent of the total number of household deposit accounts and the 
bottom half of the income distribution own only one of every six accounts.  
Unfortunately, we do not know from this evidence what is the distribution across income 
deciles of deposits by value.
5  We do know that only about 24 percent of the adult 
population has a bank account in Mexico City.   Even lower percentages are reported 
elsewhere.
6   
 
It might, therefore seem that loss of deposits is likely to reduce inequality.  If so, this 
might be taken as evidence that bailing-out depositors is a regressive policy.  However, in 
order to see just how regressive , the skewed distribution of bank deposit holdings needs 
to be compared with the skewed distribution of household incomes.  After all, the top 
decile of income earners in the Mexico receives about 42 percent of household income 
whereas the bottom quintile receives little more than 3 percent of household income.  
Thus the departure from proportionality represents only a small fraction of the total sums 
disbursed in the bail-out.   
 
Ironically, a policy which begins by financing liquidity problems of the banking system 
(and foreign exchange outflows) arising from depositor withdrawals but is then followed 
by suspension and not paying the remaining depositors (or paying them only in 
depreciated currency) after the bank fails, or the currency collapses, is likely to be much 
more regressive.  As is comprehensively documented for the cases of Argentina, Ecuador 
and Uruguay by Halac and Schmukler, it is the largest depositors who withdraw first 
(even while smaller depositors are still adding to their deposit holdings).  Likely the large 
and well-informed depositors who withdraw early are mostly corporates, but wealthy 
individuals will also be in this category.
7 Their relative gains are unlikely to show up in 
surveys of income and expenditure.  
 
                                                 
5 This information is available for some advanced economies.  Interestingly, bank deposits form a much 
lower proportion of financial asset holdings for higher income deciles in advanced economies, reducing the 
dispersion of deposit holdings.  
6 At one extreme, a recent Tanzanian survey found that 94 percent of households had no bank deposits. 
7  In Uruguay, most of the withdrawals were by non-residents, presumably from Argentina.   8
Halac and Schmukler’s work points to the value of using survey information on financial 
service usage in assessing the effects of financial crises.  A growing number of household 
surveys around the world contain information on access to financial services, though not 
enough to provide a range of “before and after” cases for econometric work.   In 
particular, LSMS surveys, some of which contain quite detailed information on 
household access to certain financial services, are conducted rather infrequently, with the 
result that changes between before and after crises cannot readily be read off the 
findings.
8  However they can provide a benchmark for the before- or after-crisis 
distribution of financial access.  Table 1 provides a list of recent LSMS surveys 
containing financial sector information
9 together with the dates of the most recent 
banking crises reported for these countries.  (This information is not pursued further in 
the present draft of this paper, but may be useful for future work.) 
 
Tracking other channels 
There is no comparably clearcut way of isolating the likely distributional effects of the 
remaining channels.  This is especially true of the last two, inasmuch as they could be 
experienced as a result of non-financial shocks.  How is the analyst to distinguish 
between job losses that are due to a disruption of the payments process and those arising 
from a general downturn in the rest of the economy?   
 
One approach involves identifying characteristic patterns of relative price change 
following a banking crisis. A temporary surge in inflation is a common occurrence 
following banking crises that have been associated with macro downturns (though this is 
not necessarily the case, and is not always observed).  Inasmuch as inflation is typically 
inequality-increasing, this can be regarded as inequality increasing.  Real wages have 
often fallen in such circumstances, and Diwan (2001) has shown a tendency for the share 
of labor in national income to decline during financial crises (counting currency crises as 
well as banking crises); however, sharp macroeconomic downturns have often been 
associated with a relative decline in the wages of highly-skilled workers, so it is not clear 
that wage movements will be inequality increasing.
10  Interest rate levels and spreads also 
typically increase. 
 
An alternative to decomposing the effects into different channels is the holistic or 
reductionist approach of examining directly the movements of inequality and poverty 
around the time of crises.  
 
                                                 
8 It would, for example, be useful to discover whether spending patterns of households with better access to 
finance before the crisis are better insulated from the crisis, but this cannot readily be detected without 
having a post-crisis survey as well. 
9 In addition some specialized financial sector usage surveys also explore these areas (cf. Honohan, 2004). 
10 Sanchez and Schady (2003) document this pattern in their study based on household surveys for six Latin 
American countries.  Their sample includes “Chile in 1972-75, and again in 1982-83, Argentina in 1988-
1990, Brazil in 1981-83, and again in 1990-92, Colombia in 1999, and Mexico in 1995. With the exception 
of the Mexican tequila crisis of 1995 and the Colombian recession of 1999, all of these crises have been 
associated with pronounced decreases in the relative demand for the most educated workers.” Sustained 
downturns may, however, be associated with increases in inequality (cf. Inder, 2004).   9
3.  Some documented cases 
Indonesia 
Here an important and well-documented case is the Indonesian crisis of 1997-9.  Detailed 
analysis of household surveys taken just before, during and after the crisis displays 
graphically how living standards fall across the board, but tells a more mixed story about 
relative effects (Frankenberg et al, 1998, Strauss et al. 2004 – see Annex 1).  The 
indicators are that, while absolute poverty rates soared from perhaps 15 percent of the 
population to 33 percent, the (relative) distribution of income became less unequal.
11  
Also, remarkably, three years after the crisis hit, absolute poverty rates had dropped back 
below their pre-crisis levels.  
 
Is the Indonesian case representative?  Because of the nature of the data collected, the 
channels of influence from financial firm failure to poverty are hidden.  Huge changes in 
relative prices, and some deterioration in the quality (and increase in the relative price) of 
public health services are the proximate causes of changes in poverty and inequality as 
measured in the Indonesian household data.  These relative price changes were closely 
linked with the very large exchange rate movements that characterized the Indonesian 
crisis.  Food prices in particular adjusted more and faster than other prices.  In addition, 
there were widespread business failures and civic disturbances.  Other financial crises 
have not been associated with as much macroeconomic and political turmoil and with 
such sharp changes in relative prices.  This is the first reason for skepticism about how 
readily one can generalize from the Indonesian experience. 
 
But in addition, it is well established that large macroeconomic adjustments can be 
associated with relative price changes that actually benefit large segments of the poor 
population (Ferreira et al. 1999, Manuelyan-Atinc and Walton, 1998).  The contrast 
between Latin American and African adjustments in the 1980s is often mentioned: the 
increase in producer prices for small African farmers resulting from real devaluations in 
several countries helped improve income inequality there, whereas Latin America 
experienced deteriorating income inequality.
12  
 
Third, the endogenous economic mechanisms for adjusting to shocks differ from country 
to country.  For example, Behrman et al. (2000) show that labor market adjustment in the 
1997-8 Thai crisis involved considerable increases in involuntary unemployment but no 
decline in real wage rates and no evidence of the increased employment that happened at 
                                                 
11Note, however, that, in contrast to the before-and-after comparison of measured inequality, the 
microsimulation model of Robilliard et al. (2002) implies that the pattern of price and wage changes, credit 
crunch, etc., of the Indonesian crisis would have increased inequality slightly (discussed further in the 
Annex).   
12Lustig (2000) shows that widening inequalities were seen in 15 of the 20 macroeconomic crises which she 
studies from Latin America 1980-95.  In a provocative and not unrelated analysis, Behrman et al. (2001) 
argue that financial liberalization contributed to the worsening of income distribution in Latin America in 
the 1990s.  They regress the Gini, and the log-difference between the mean income of the top decile (or of 
the median income), and the mean income of the bottom 30 percent on a number of measures of policy, 
including an index of financial liberalization, as well as measures of inflation, macroeconomic volatility 
and the real exchange rate.  The financial liberalization index, from Morley et al. (1999), is based on 
whether or not there were controls on deposit and lending rates, and on the ratio of reserves to deposits in 
the banking system.     10
roughly the same time in Indonesia.  These contrasts were already foreseen in 
Manuelyan-Atinc and Walton (1998). 
 
Finally, even if the impact of crisis on market price and incomes was the same the world 
over, the ability and willingness of the government to maintain or improve the safety net 
is most unlikely to be.   
 
For all of these reasons, generalization from the Indonesian experience should be done 
with care. Nevertheless, each continent has seen important recent crises for which studies 
suggest that they have also been associated with narrowing inequalities.   
 
Mexico, 1994 
Baldacci et al. (2002) present some detail on shifts in Mexican income distribution for the 
three Mexican National Household Income and Costs Surveys (ENIGH) 1992, 1994 and 
1996.  Poverty incidence increased dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the crisis – 
moderate poverty (as nationally defined) jumped from 36 to 48 percent of the population 
and extreme poverty from 11 to 17 percent in the two years to 1996.  Nevertheless, the 
lower deciles were not the worst affected in relative terms.  The income share of the top 
decile fell from 44 percent to 42 percent, with gains in all of the other deciles (except the 
fourth).   Accordingly, not only the Gini, but the Theil and Atkinson’s indices (for 
parameters 0.5, 1 and 2) all show improvements.  This holds for both the data on income 
and expenditure. Baldacci et al. also show that the change between 1992 and 1996 in the 
probability of being poor in Mexico is systematically related to geographical and age 
characteristics: households in Yucatan province, and in urban areas, and those with very 
young or very old heads, all displayed a heightened propensity to be poor.  Transfers kept 
6.1 percent of the population out of poverty in 1996, compared with 4.5 percent in 1994 – 
suggesting little improvement in the scale or targeting of income transfers. 
 
Actually, the Mexican case alerts us to just how severe are data problems on inequality 
from standard sources.  Even as straightforward a question such as: “did the Gini 
coefficient increase in Mexico between 1994 and 1996” produces conflicting answers in 
the literature.  Table 2 and Figure 1 show the trend in the Gini coefficient 1992-1998 as 
reported in different studies mostly based on the ENIGH.   The apparently sizable 
increase in the Gini index in 1992-95 reported by the World Bank’s Povcal is not 
confirmed by any of the other studies for the intervals 1992-94 and 1992-96.
13  (This 
needs to be borne in mind in considering the findings of Section 5, which is based on 




Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) review the experience with the Russian crisis of 1998.  
Their major interest is in examining the role of the safety net in favorably impacting the 
distributional and poverty impact; they conclude that changes in the safety net had a 
                                                 
13 Although included in Povcal, this 1995 estimate is annotated as “less reliable” in the WIID2 database. 
14 Using household panel data, Fields and Sanchez (2004) provide details on the Argentina case of 2001-2 
suggesting that, although the Gini coefficient worsened, it was not those who had escaped from poverty 
pre-crisis that fell back.   11
mixed record in this regard. Their analysis is based on two successive rounds of the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (carried out with about 3,800 households in 
October 1996 and November 1998 respectively).  In the crisis, mean household 
expenditure fell by about 20 percent and poverty headcount (national definition, 
expenditure) rose from 22 percent to 33 percent.  On the other hand, inequality narrowed: 
the Gini coefficient for expenditure actually fell from 0.44 to 0.42; from 0.48 to 0.42 for 
income.  Interestingly, there were on average expenditure gains by the poor between 
1996 and 1998, and 42 percent of the 1996 poor had escaped from poverty two years 
later. The apparent paradox (gains by the poor, but increasing poverty headcount) is 
resolved by realizing that the overall increase in headcount reflected the very large 
number – over a quarter – of the previously non-poor that fell into poverty.  Increases in 
poverty rates are lower if measured in terms of income rather than expenditure, and it 
seems that the expenditure responses reflected excessively precautionary behavior.   
 
African crises of the 1990s 
Sizable short-run improvements in inequality were recorded in three African countries, 
Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, around the time that their banking crises broke in 1993-5 
(Figure 2).  Yet it may be unwise to jump to conclusions about the causality of such a 
correlation.  For none of these three crises were associated with any large output dip (cf. 
the country entries in Caprio et al., 2005).  The Uganda case relates to the decision to face 
up to the deep insolvency of a large state-owned bank at the center of the system.  The 
Kenya and Zambia cases related to mismanagement and perhaps fraud at sizable banks 
unrelated to macroeconomic conditions.  It is likely that the distributional changes that 
occurred in these countries during the mid-1990s were more closely related to terms of 
trade changes that were rather independent of the banking conditions. 
 
These important cases highlight the possibility that banking crises can be accompanied by 
falling inequality.  The next section examines the full set of documented banking crises to 
see what have been the associated movements of inequality. 
 
4.  Broad cross-country evidence  
In this section, we look at cross-country data on Gini coefficients of income or 
expenditure and on the distribution-related changes in poverty.  A caveat is in order.  It is 
not implied that Gini, or indeed relative inequality in general, is the most important 
aspect of the welfare impact of financial crises.  Indeed, as mentioned above the Gini is 
very far from being a useful measure of welfare in this context, not least because an 
uniform percentage reduction in cash income may have a much greater impact on the 
welfare of the poor than that of the rich.
15 Instead, the purpose here is the analytical one 
of isolating distributional effects from the (larger) overall welfare effects which result 
especially from the across-the-board decline in mean income at all level of society which 
is typical of many crises.
16   
                                                 
15 Despite the logical difficulties involved in making interpersonal comparisons, Atkinson’s index based on 
the perspective of an inequality-averse social welfare function, or poverty measures such as the FGT class 
can be used to address the wider welfare questions. 
16 The common presumption that poverty headcount invariably increases around crises is also contradicted 
by Povcal data (cf. Figure 3, where the dates and cases correspond to those used in Table 3b).   In most   12
 
However one wants to approach the issue, the raw material will be the change in real 
income and expenditure of different income deciles, and for this one must consult the 
evidence of household surveys. 
 
For a wide cross-country analysis of movements in poverty and inequality around the 
time of financial crises, the Povcal database is an inevitable choice.  It contains such data 
for 95 countries and between one and 14 different years (an average of 4-5 observations 
for each country).  Matching this with the Caprio-Klingebiel banking crisis data set 
giving details on 180 crises in 149 countries (including advanced economies) offers the 
prospect of assessing correlations in a useful way (Caprio et al. 2005). 
 
Timing 
Yet we have to be careful. Timing of the crises is one of the most uncertain aspects of the 
crisis database, yet issues of timing are crucial to our analysis of the effects of crisis on 
poverty and inequality, if we are to capture what (as argued above) are potentially 
contrasting short-term and long-term effects. 
 
The only systematic econometric cross-country study of which I am aware that attempts 
to detect the impact of banking crises on inequality is Lopez (2004).
17  The goal of his 
paper is to explore the impact of different policy approaches on inequality and growth in 
the short run and in the long run. He uses a somewhat larger database, that used by Dollar 
and Kraay (2002) (updated), and focuses on changes in inequality over five-year 
intervals.  Lopez’s solution to the timing problem is to take non-overlapping five-year 
intervals and choose the latest available Gini coefficient in each interval.  For banking 
crises (only one of his explanatory variables), he uses the number of years in the relevant 
five-year period for which a crisis is ongoing.
18  Lopez employs the Arellano-Bond 
GMM econometric methodology which involves double differencing of this data, and this 
arguably places a premium on data accuracy.
19  Interestingly, he finds that the crisis 
variable is highly significant, with a t-statistic of over 4.
20  Five-year periods in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries, however, poverty headcount is, however, on a downward medium-term trend which somewhat 
complicates the separate identification of the effects of shocks.  The problem is illustrated in the data of 
Table 4, where a sharp fall in the poverty headcount in Ghana is the most dominant feature.  Adjusting for 
the different trends in different countries uses up most of the available degrees of freedom.  
17 Panizza (2004) also provides some evidence, but limits himself to the Latin American cases also studied 
by Lustig (2000). 
18 Note the implicit assumption here that, if a country is not reported in the crisis database as having an 
ongoing crisis, then it is crisis-free for that period.  However the authors of the crisis database have warned 
that it is an incomplete catalog of crises, and does not declare as crisis-free the countries and dates that are 
not mentioned. 
19 And also reduces the degrees of freedom because of the need to exclude countries with fewer than three 
observations.  From 953 observations on 137 countries, the double differencing reduces the effective 
sample size to 194 observations on 61 countries.  Further merging with the policy and growth data reduces 
Lopez sample further to 134 observations on 41 countries. 
20 His other policy variables include: initial GDP per capita, initial output gap, education (secondary 
enrolment), financial depth, trade openness, government consumption as share GDP, public infrastructure 
(telephone lines) price stability, governance (first principal component of the ICRG indicators), cyclical 
volatility, external imbalances, and the growth in the terms of trade. All but the last four are found to be 
significant in explaining changes in the Gini.  The inclusion of several variables likely to be correlated with   13
there are more crisis years experience a decline in inequality. The size of the effect 
indicated by the point estimate is not huge: a five-year long crisis is estimated to lower 
the log of Gini by 0.02, equivalent at the sample mean value to moving the Gini from 
0.376 to 0.368. 
 
Lopez’s finding can be seen as broadly consistent with the Indonesian evidence, and the 
other cases mentioned where Gini has declined around the time of crises.   
 
By taking the number of crisis years in a given five-year period as the crisis variable, he 
is implicitly focusing on short and medium-term impacts of the crisis denouement.  
However, this variable entails heavy reliance on the accuracy of the crisis end-dates, 
whereas it is known that these dates are especially uncertain, essentially because the 
process of resolving failed financial institutions is a long-drawn-out one.  Thus, in respect 
of several crises, no end-point is shown despite the fact that the crisis has been fully 
resolved.  (Lesotho is a good example: taking the lack of an end-date as an indication that 
the crisis shown as beginning in 1988 was still running in 2002 would be misleading.) 
 
Furthermore, the alignment of the Gini and crisis measures is somewhat problematic, 
given that some of the Ginis are measured early within the five-year period and possibly 
before even a crisis that scores 0.6 or 0.8 on the index got under way. 
 
These timing issues are likely to bedevil any work in this area; noting them does not 
detract from the useful exercise carried out by Lopez, but points to the desirability of 
looking further at the dynamics of the Gini around the known crisis dates. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that another major difficulty in mechanically applying the 
crisis database is that many of the countries without reported crises are known to have 
rather dysfunctional controlled banking systems, but ones which have managed to remain 
solvent or nearly so. 
 
Gini coefficients before and after crises 
(a) Long-term effects 
Looking first at long-term effects, it is of interest to compare Gini coefficients measured 
before any crisis hit, with those measured a sufficiently long interval (say ten years) after 
any crisis was reported as being in progress.   
 
Because of the frequency and protracted nature of banking crises, there are relatively few 
datapoints in either category.  Thus, confining ourselves to the data in Povcal (and 
excluding transition economies
21), we obtain just 23 pre-crisis Gini observations, with a 
range from 0.26 to 0.63, a mean of 0.439 and a standard deviation of 0.102.  As for 
“long-after” post-crisis observations, i.e. those 10 years or more after the last recorded 
crisis date, there are also 23 of these, ranging from 0.29 to 0.74, with a mean of 0.476 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
banking crises – complicates the interpretation.  Also note that, contrary to other results in the literature 
(e.g. Beck et al., 2004) financial deepening is found by Lopez to worsen inequality.  
21 For whom the strong, known, dynamics of increasing measured inequality will surely swamp any crisis 
effects.   14
a standard deviation of 0.116 (Table 1 (a); Figure 4).  Unfortunately, only two countries 
(Colombia and Madagascar) are in both sets (Colombia shows an almost unchanged Gini 
as between the before and after calculation at 0.59; Madagascar shows a decline from 
0.49 to 0.42).  As a result, comparison of the summary statistics must be done with some 
caution. However, there is no decisive support in this data for the hypothesis, discussed 
above, that pre-crisis Ginis would be systematically higher than post-crisis.  The scatter is 
simply too wide, and other country and conjunctural influences swamp any systematic 
effects of banking crises. 
 
If we had before and after data on numerous countries, we could take the before-after 
difference as an indication of the impact of the crisis, since doing so would eliminate 
country fixed effects.  However, given that this data represents almost disjoint sets of 
“before any” and “long after” countries, we cannot do this (or even use country 
dummies).  Instead, in seeking to identify the effect of crises, we need to control for other 
factors that affect the general level of Gini in different countries.  If we can pin down a 
small but important set of such factors, this will allow the effect of crises to be estimated 
more reliably by including a 0-1 dummy variable indicating whether each observation is 
a “before any” or “long after” Gini.  In fact, the inequality literature does not seem to 
point very clearly to what these determinants might be, and clearly there is the risk of 
data-mining exercise.  Nevertheless, an R-squared of 0.61 can be achieved, for example, 
in a regression of the long-term pre-or-post crisis Ginis (N=43) by inclusion of dummies 
for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, average inflation rate, the Heritage 
Foundation index of “economic freedom” and the (log of) GNP per capita (all of which 
have an estimated positive effect on Gini).  Even with these base-level controls, the 
before-or-after dummy does not contribute significantly to the fit.  The point estimate is 
positive, implying an increase of about 0.02 in the Gini, i.e. more inequality after the 
crisis, but this estimate is statistically insignificant (Regression Table 1a, b).
22 
 
In order to detect whether alternative policy approaches influenced the long-term 
inequality impact of crises, we can try adding variables indicating the financial sector 
policies adopted around crises.  Unfortunately, the overlap between this set of countries 
and those in Honohan-Klingebiel (2003) is slight, covering only 9 countries.  However it 
is suggestive that the policy orientation found by HK to lower fiscal costs (i.e. non-
accommodating policies – no unlimited depositor guarantees or extensive capital 
forbearance) are also found to be associated with reductions in Gini, often significantly 
(Regression Table 1c).
23  as between “before any” and “long after”.  (Of course this 
approach is limited by the consideration that HK looked only at crisis events, and as such 
neglect the potential protective role of these policies in avoiding crises.)  
 
                                                 
22 Inclusion of other controls, such as measures of financial depth, legal origin, property rights protection, 
corruption, illiteracy or population size do not significantly alter the picture.  These regressions all exclude 
Transition economies. 
23 The results shown encompass the full set of policy variables in Honohan-Klingebiel for which results can 
be obtained for this sample.  Their variable LIQSUP is invariant in this sample, while FORBA, FORBB and 
REPCAP are perfectly correlated.   15
Of course, as mentioned, factors other than financial sector policy, including the 
economy’s ability to absorb shocks and safety net policies, are key determinants of the 
inequality consequences of a crisis.  The equations presented remain quite 
underspecified. 
 
(b) Short-term effects 
However, the same database allows us a somewhat clearer look at short-term impacts.  
First, there are 13 cases where we have an estimate both of the immediate pre-crisis Gini 
(not more than three years before the onset of the crisis) and that which is observed in the 
immediate aftermath of the end of the crisis.  These are plotted in Figure 5.  We 
immediately see that, once more, there is no general tendency for a reduction in the Gini 
in this time interval.  Indeed, the mean Gini increases slightly (and without statistical 
significance) from 0.428 to 0.437.  Sizable Gini falls are recorded for Zambia, Algeria, 
Yemen and Madagascar, but these are offset by increases in Nigeria, Costa Rica, 
Bangladesh and Nepal.  
 
Perhaps more interesting is an even shorter time frame which looks at individual crises, 
as distinct from the entire country crisis history, and takes cases where a Gini estimate is 
available shortly (not more than 3 years) before the onset of the crisis and shortly (again 
not more than 3 years) after the onset.  This provides a shorter interval and as such is less 
likely to be contaminated by secular trends.  This data is available for twelve crises from 
eleven non-Transition countries and is shown in shown in Table 3 (panel b) and plotted in 
Figure 2.  In this case too, there are both increases and declines in the Gini,  but this time 
there is a small (still statistically insignificant) average decline in the Gini as predicted by 
the short-term hypothesis discussed above.  Interestingly, there is a clear regional pattern 
to the increases and decreases.  All but one of the increases in inequality during the crisis 
are in Latin America, all of the decreases are elsewhere (Africa and Asia).   The small 
number of observations militate against worthwhile regression analysis: as illustrated in 
Regression Table 2, only the Africa dummy is significant. 
 
Distributional effects on poverty near crises 
A third approach to selecting and sorting the cross-country information is to move to the 
careful decomposition prepared by Kraay (2004) of changes in poverty between the part 
attributable to changes in mean income (at a constant Lorenz curve) and the part 
attributable to distributional shifts.  Kraay has conducted this decomposition for over 200 
non-overlapping intervals for which sufficient data is available, and I am very grateful to 
him for making this data available to me before its publication.  Of these intervals, some 
42 span the onset of a banking crisis recorded in the Caprio et al. database in the sense 
that the first year of the crisis either coincides with the start of the data interval, or is after 
that start date and strictly before the end date of the data interval.  Note that this choice of 
intervals is rather different to that employed above, but is conceptually somewhat close to 
the short-term individual crisis calculation.  Nevertheless, this approach gives us a larger 
set of observations, 41 of which 16 relate to transition economies.   
 
Regression analysis of the 25 non-transition cases suggests that, even when poverty 
increases with a fall in overall income following crisis, the impact of distributional   16
changes following the onset of crisis actually work on average in the direction of 
lowering poverty (though this is not statistically significant), except in Latin America.  
Attempts to detect whether certain country institutional characteristics or crisis 
characteristics (using the Honohan, 2000, classification system) influence this effect were 
broadly unsuccessful.  Interestingly, though, the KKZ indicator of corruption was 
associated with favorable distributional changes: possibly suggesting that in corrupt 
countries the crises were associated with a loss of previous privilege  by beneficiaries of 
corruption. These regressions have large outliers, though (notably Kenya and the Kyrgyz 
Republic), and the size and significance of coefficients are sensitive to the inclusion or 
otherwise of these outliers (Regression Table 3).   
 
This overview of the evidence from cross-country data confirms that the short-run pattern 
of inequality movements around banking crises differs from country to country.  Outside 
of Latin America, these short-term changes are more likely than not to have been 
favorable to distribution.  
 
The small number of specific crises for which appropriately-timed inequality data are 
available and the likely high noise-to-signal ratio in the inequality data militate against 
successful multivariate statistical analysis to control for independent causal factors 
influencing inequality movements around the time of the crisis.  
 
5.   Policy conclusions 
 
Available cross-country data on movements in inequality around the time of banking 
crises do not send very clear messages on the factors that influence whether crises will be 
associated with more or less inequality.  This contrasts with recent evidence that financial 
deepening is a causal factor in reducing poverty (Honohan, 2004a and b, Beck Demirgűç-
Kunt and Levine, 2004).   
 
This is not the place to discuss general policy measures to reduce the frequency and scale 
of systemic banking crises and to improve containment and resolution of those that occur.  
Banking policies that improve the soundness of the banking system, thereby reducing the 
frequency of crises, are likely to be associated with less inequality and faster reduction in 
poverty in the long run. 
 
Nevertheless, the discussion does suggest some general policy recommendations.  For 
one thing, the way in which withdrawals of wealthy and well-informed depositors are 
often financed by central bank liquidity lending needs careful consideration at the 
containment stage of crises: all too often national foreign exchange reserves are deeply 
eroded in this process without any realistic hope of such lending preventing the need for 
bank intervention and indeed devaluation.  These policies may occasionally be an 
appropriate tactic to head off an irrational speculative attack on a fundamentally sound 
banking system, but all too often are employed in circumstances where they are unlikely 
to succeed.  Then, while they may buy a postponement of the crisis, this will be at the 
cost of an adverse distributional impact. 
   17
More generally, accommodating policies, including an overly generous depositor safety 
net, risk worsening the ultimate fiscal costs, thereby limiting the scope for other safety 
net policies of more relevance to the poor. 
 
The fact that income inequality has frequently narrowed at times of banking crisis does 
not remove the need for policy action to minimize and alleviate the jump in poverty 
which often accompanies these events.  To a large extent this relates to safety net and 
macroeconomic management policies not specific to the financial sector and which have 
been extensively discussed in the literature (Ferreira et al. 1999, Manuelyan-Atinc and 
Walton, 1998). 
   18
 
Table 1:  LSMS Surveys with Financial Sector Information and Dates of Crises 
  Date of LSMS  Date of Crisis 
Albania 2002  1992–96 
Armenia 1996  1994–96 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  2001  1992– 
Brazil 1996/97  1994–99 
Bulgaria 2001  1996–97 
China  1995 & 1997  1990s– 
Côte d'Ivoire  1988  1988–91 
Ecuador 1998  1998–2001 
Ghana 1998/99  1982–89 
Guatemala 2000  1990s 
Guyana 1992/93   
India 1997/98  1993– 
Kosovo 2000   
Jamaica 1997  1994 
Kazakhstan 1996   
Kyrgyz Republic  1998  1990s 
Morocco 1991  Early  1980s 
Nepal 1996  1988 
Nicaragua 1998-99  Late  1980s–96 
Pakistan 1991   
Panama 1997  1988–89 
Peru 1994  1983–90 
Romania 1994/95  1990–96 
Russia 1992  1995 
South Africa  1993  1989– 
Tajikistan 1999  1996– 
Vietnam 1997-98  1997– 
Note: Italicized dates denote non-systemic crisis.   




Table 2:  Mexico: Alternative estimates of Household Inequality Gini 1992-1998. 
Author    Concept    1992 1994 1996 1998
Luxembourg Income Study  Net Income  54.5 55.3  53.4  54.8
Szekely and Hilgert (1999)  Net Income  53.4 53.6  52.8  
Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (2000)  Total Income  53.1 53.4  51.9  
Baldacci et al (2002)    Income    54.1 54.2  51.6  
Baldacci et al (2002)    Consumption 52.7 51.6  50.2   
Deininger and Squire (2004)  Gross income  60.7 56.4  54.9  55.4
World Development Indicators/Povcal Expenditure  50.3 53.7
a 51.9 53.1
a1995 
Source: WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID), Baldacci et al. (2002), 
Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (2000), Povcal (accessed August 2004).  19
 
Table 3: Gini Coefficients before and after Banking Crises 
            
(a)  Before, after end of, and long after end of all of the crises in each country 
    Before any  Soon after end  Long after end
DZA  Algeria  40.1 1988  35.3 1995    
BGD  Bangladesh  25.9 1983  31.8 2000    
BWA  Botswana        6 0 . 4 1989 
BRA  Brazil  59.5 1985  59.2 2001    
BDI  Burundi  33.3 1992       
CHL  Chile        5 6 . 3 1997 
COL  Colombia  59.1 1980  59.3 1998  59.3 1998 
CRI  Costa Rica  42.5 1990  47.9 1998    
CIV  Côte d’Ivoire  40.1 1986  36.8 1994    
DOM  Dominican Republic  49.2 1995       
EGY  Egypt        3 3 . 5 1997 
SLV  El Salvador        5 3 . 3 2000 
ETH  Ethiopia        3 4 . 1 1992 
GMB  Gambia, The        4 9 1995 
GTM  Guatemala        5 8 . 4 1993 
HND  Honduras        5 6 1993 
IND  India        3 2 . 5 1990 
IDN  Indonesia  33.7 1990       
IRN  Iran        4 4 . 5 1992 
JAM  Jamaica  38.9 1990       
JOR  Jordan        3 8 . 6 1992 
LSO  Lesotho        5 9 1992 
MDG  Madagascar  46.8 1980  46.1 1993  42.3 2000 
MYS  Malaysia  48.6 1984       
MAR  Morocco        3 9 . 5 1998 
NAM  Namibia        7 4 . 3 1993 
NPL  Nepal  31.7 1984  36.7 1995    
NGA  Nigeria  38.7 1985  50.6 1996    
PAK  Pakistan        3 2 . 2 1993 
PAN  Panama        5 6 . 6 2000 
PGY  Paraguay  39.7 1990       
PER  Peru        4 9 . 8 2000 
RWA  Rwanda        2 8 . 9 1984 
SLE  Sierra Leone  62.9 1989       
ZAF  South Africa        5 7 . 8 1996 
LKA  Sri Lanka  32.5 1985  34.4 1995    
LCA  St Lucia        4 2 . 6 1995 
SWZ  Swaziland  60.7 1994       
THA  Thailand  45.2 1981       
TTO  Trinidad        4 1 . 4 1990 
TUN  Tunisia        4 1 . 5 1993 
UGA  Uganda  43.8 1990  43.1 1999    
YEM  Yemen  39.4 1992  33.4 1998    
ZMB  Zambia  56.9 1992  51.2 1997     
ZWE  Zimbabwe  39.4 1990       
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(b)  Just before and just after onset of particular event   
    Before Just  after  onset 
ARG  Argentina, 1995  45.4 1992  48.6 1996 
BRA  Brazil, 1994  59.8 1993  61.5 1995 
ARG  Argentina, 1989  44.5 1986  45.4 1992 
MEX  Mexico, 1994  50.3 1992  51.9 1996 
PHL  Philippines, 1998  46.2 1997  46.1 2000 
KEN  Kenya, 1993  57.5 1992  44.5 1994 
THA  Thailand, 1997  43.4 1997  41.4 1998 
ZMB  Zambia, 1995  52.6 1993  49.8 1996 
CRI  Costa Rica, 1994  46.3 1993  47.1 1996 
UGA  Uganda, 1994  43.2 1992  37.4 1996 
JAM  Jamaica, 1994  35.7 1993  36.4 1996 
BGD  Bangladesh, 1980s  26.9 1985  28.8 1988 
  Mean  46.0 45.1 
  Standard deviation  8.9 8.5 
          
 
(c)  Just before and just after onset of particular event - Transition economies 
   Before  Just  after  onset   
BGR  Bulgaria, 1996  31.1 1995  26.4 1997   
CZE  Czech Republic, 1989  19.4 1988  26.5 1993   
EST  Estonia, 1992  23.0 1988  39.5 1993   
HUN  Hungary, 1991  25.0 1989  27.9 1993   
LVA  Latvia, 1995  27.0 1993  31.6 1996   
LTU  Lithuania, 1995  37.2 1994  32.4 1996   
POL  Poland, 1992  26.9 1989  32.7 1996   
ROM  Romania, 1990  23.3 1989  25.5 1992   
RUS  Russia, 1995  46.2 1996  45.6 2000   
RUS  Russia, 1998  48.3 1993  46.2 1996   
SVK  Slovakia, 1991  19.5 1988  19.5 1992   
UKR  Ukraine, 1997  33.2 1996  29.0 1999   
  Mean  30.0 31.9   
  Standard deviation  9.6 8.1   
 
Note: Crisis dates are drawn from Caprio et al. 2004.  For panel (a), in respect of each country in the Povcal 
database, other than Transition economies, Gini coefficients were extracted where available for dates (i) 
before any crisis hit (within 10 years); (ii) soon after the end of all crises (within 5 years); (iii) long after 
the end of all crises (at least 10 years).  Ginis falling into this category were averaged and entered into the 
table together with the date to which they refer (where the Ginis are averaged over several years, the mean 
date is shown).  For panel (b), in respect of each crisis, again excluding Transition economies, Gini 
coefficients were extracted where available for dates both just before and just after the onset of the crisis 
(within 3 years in each case).  Panel (c) repeats the exercise of panel (b) for Transition economies.  Gini 
coefficients are expressed throughout as percentages.   21
Table 4: Poverty and Banking Crises 
 
This table shows changes in absolute poverty (increase in the fraction of the population 
on less than the international $1 a day benchmark) distinguishing between the parts 
attributable to mean income changes to distributional shifts in intervals for which data is 
available and which span the start of a banking crisis 




factor Change in Gini 
DZA Algeria  1988 1995 1.0 0.6 -0.7 
ARG Argentina  1992 1998 2.3 1.6 0.7 
AZE Azerbaijan  1995 2001 -5.5 -1.5 0.3 
BGD Bangladesh  1985 1988 13.1 3.1 0.6 
BOL Bolivia  1990 1999 2.9 5.3 0.3 
BRA Brazil  1989 1993 -1.9 -2.2 -0.5 
BRA Brazil  1993 1995 -3.8 -1.3 -0.8 
BGR Bulgaria  1995 2001 3.1 2.0 0.6 
BDI Burundi  1992 1998 8.8 5.0 1.5 
CHN China  1994 1995 -7.0 -2.1 -1.9 
CRI Costa  Rica  1993 1996 -0.8 0.5 0.3 
CIV Cote  d'Ivoire 1988 1993 2.1 -0.9 0.0 
CZE Czech  Republic  1988 1993 0.0 0.0 1.4 
EGY Egypt  1991 1999 -0.9 -0.4 0.3 
SLV El  Salvador  1989 1995 -2.0 -1.5 0.2 
EST Estonia  1988 1993 3.5 0.8 3.3 
GHA Ghana  1997 1999 -61.5 -2.7 -1.4 
HUN Hungary  1989 1993 0.0 0.0 1.2 
IDN Indonesia  1996 1999 5.5 -3.5 -1.6 
JAM Jamaica  1996 2000 -1.8 1.5 0.4 
KEN Kenya  1992 1994 -7.0 -14.7 -6.5 
KOR Korea  1993 1998 -19.9 -16.1 -0.6 
KGZ Kyrgyz  Republic  1993 1997 -0.2 0.0 -3.3 
LVA Latvia  1995 1998 0.4 0.4 1.3 
LTU Lithuania  1994 1996 -2.2 -0.8 4.8 
MDG Madagascar  1980 1993 11.2 -3.4 -0.3 
MEX Mexico  1989 1995 1.1 -1.6 -0.2 
PHL Philippines  1997 2000 -9.0 0.4 -0.2 
POL Poland  1992 1993 2.6 1.8 -4.0 
ROM Romania  1989 1992 0.8 0.2 0.7 
RUS Russia  1993 1996 0.9 0.3 1.5 
SVK Slovakia  1988 1992 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LKA Sri  Lanka  1985 1990 -4.7 -2.6 -0.5 
THA Thailand  1981 1988 -7.9 -2.8 -0.2 
THA Thailand  1996 1998 0.3 -0.1 -1.0 
UGA Uganda  1992 1996 -14.4 -1.9 -0.4 
UKR Ukraine  1996 1999 2.0 0.0 -1.2 
VEN Venezuela  1993 1995 5.5 3.5 2.6 
VNM Vietnam  1993 1998 -9.7 -0.8 0.3 
YEM Yemen  1992 1998 2.9 -2.4 -2.9 
ZMB Zambia  1993 1998 -5.2 5.6 1.3 
Note: Shows all spells from Kraay (2004) that span the start date of a banking crisis 
shown in Caprio et al. (2004).  Distribution factor the change in poverty (percentage 
points) attributable to actual changes in Lorenz curve, holding mean constant.   22
Regression Table 1(a): Long-term relation between crises and Gini 
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (series of Table 3a) 
Equation:  1.A 1.B 1.C 1.D 1.E 
 Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat
Constant 5.35  0.6 10.3 **6.6 7.5 0.9 14.4  1.8  13.3 1.6
Inflation 0.081  1.8 0.080 1.8 0.101 *2.2    
Institutions (Economic freedom)  10.1  **3.6 9.4 **3.3 9.6 **3.5 8.2  **2.9  8.1 **2.9
Sub-Saharan Africa  14.9  **4.0 11.8 **3.8 11.8 **3.8 12.4  **3.9  12.5 **3.9
Latin America  12.0  **2.9 9.3 *2.5 8.4 *2.3 11.5  **3.2  11.3 **3.1
Middle East and North Africa  7.0  1.5    
End of crisis dummy    4.1 1.5     2.4 0.9
Countries excluded  Trans  Trans Trans Trans    Trans
R-squared / NOBS  0.504  43 0.473 43 0.504 43 0.430  43  0.442 43
Adjusted R-squared  0.437  0.418 0.437 0.387    0.384
S.E. of regression  8.4   8.6 8.43   8.81   8.8
Log  likelihood  -149.5   -150.8 -149.5   -152.5   -152.0
 
Regression Table 1(b): Long-term relation between crises and Gini  
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (series of Table 3a) 
Equation: 1.F  1.G  1.H  1.I  1.J 
 Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat
Constant -35.2  *2.4 -34.1 *2.3 -200.8 0.3 -18.8  1.3  -18.9 1.3
Inflation 0.080  2.0 0.092 *2.2 0.092 2.0    
Institutions (Economic freedom)  6.1  *2.3 6.4 *2.4 6.3 *2.3    
Sub-Saharan Africa  16.0  **5.4 15.8 **5.3 15.7 **5.1 15.5  **5.0  9.8 **4.9
Latin  America  6.1 *2.3 7.1 *2.1 6.8 2.0 9.8  **3.0 15.5 **3.0
GNI per cap (PPP, log)  6.7  **3.6 6.3 **3.3 6.3 **3.3 6.9  **3.9  7.0 **3.7
End of crisis dummy    2.3 1.0 1.8 0.6     -0.2 0.1
Date    0.084 0.3    
Countries excluded  Trans  Trans Trans Trans    Trans
R-squared / NOBS  0.610  43 0.620 43 0.621 43 0.486  45  0.486 45
Adjusted R-squared  0.557  0.556 0.545 0.448    0.434
S.E.  of  regression  7.5   7.5  7.6  8.2   8.3
Log  likelihood  -144.3   -143.8  -143.7  -156.4   -156.4  23
Regression Table 1(c): Long-term relation between crises and Gini 
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (series of Table 3a) 
Equation: 1.K  1.L  1.M  1.N  1.O 
 Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat
Constant -95.8  **9.2 -100.8 **7.6 -105.6 **8.0 -90.0  **5.2  -88.1 **3.0
Inflation      
Institutions (Economic freedom)         
Sub-Saharan Africa  18.4  **9.5 19.6 **8.4 20.6 **9.0 17.8  **5.8  17.9 **3.4
Latin America  13.7  **13.4 12.8 **10.0 12.9 **9.0 12.1  **6.9  11.2 **4.0
GNI per cap (PPP, log)  15.9  **12.5 16.6 **10.7 17.2 **11.0 15.4  **7.5  15.1 **4.3
End of crisis dummy    1.8 1.2    
Date       
Policy -1.9  *2.2    
Policy x End of crisis dummy  7.7  **6.1 5.1 *2.2 7.1 **4.1 4.2  *2.8  2.2 0.6
Which policy  GUAR  GUAR GUAR FORB1    PDRP
Countries excluded  Trans  Trans Trans Trans    Trans
R-squared / NOBS  0.997  9 0.995 9 0.993 9 0.986  9  0.964 9
Adjusted R-squared  0.992  0.986 0.985 973    0.928
S.E.  of  regression  1.0  1.3  1.4  1.8   3.0  
Log  likelihood  -7.6  -10.2  -11.9  -14.6   -19.0  
** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
The dependent variable is the “long before” and “long after” Gini coefficients reported in Table 3(a) 
Inflation rate is the mean of CPI inflation for the 1990s (Source International Financial Statistics) 
Institutional variable is the Heritage Foundation index of overall economic freedom – average of 1995-99 figures 
subtracted from 6.  GNI per capita at PPP is from World Development Indicators.  Policy variables are as defined 
in Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).  GUAR takes the value 1 if there was blanket government guarantee of 
deposits; FORBA indicates capital forbearance; PDRP indicates existence of a debtor relief program. 




Regression Table 2: Short-term crisis-Gini links 
Dependent variable: Change in Gini between just before and just after onset of crisis  
(series of Table 3b) 
Equation: 2.A  2.B  2.C  2.D   
 Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat 
Constant 0.97  1.1 -0.07 0.0 1.62 0.7 -1.06  0.2 
Africa -8.17  **4.6 -7.13 **3.2 -8.27 **4.3 -8.10  **4.3 
Latin America    1.55 0.8    
Institutions (Corrupt)    -0.134 0.3 0.045  0.4 
Initial Gini       
Countries excluded  None  None  None None   
R-squared / NOBS  0.676  12 0.698 12 0.679 12 0.683  12 
Adjusted R-squared  0.644  0.631 0.608 0.613   
S.E.  of  regression  2.7  2.7  2.8  2.8     
Log  likelihood  -27.8   -27.3  -27.7  -27.6     
** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Regression Table 3: Distribution effect on poverty near crises 
Dependent variable: Change in poverty headcount at unchanged mean income (series of Table 4) 
Equation: 3.A  3.B  3.C   3.D  3.E 
 Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat
Constant -0.80  0.5 0.56 0.7 3.13 *2.5 3.03  *2.5  4.98 1.9
Latin America  2.26  1.3 1.66 1.7 2.27 *2.1 2.46  *2.4  2.80 *2.2
Transition -0.01  0.1 0.132 0.2    
Institutions (Corrupt)  -0.102  0.4 -0.244 1.6 -0.839 **3.1 -0.901  **3.4  -0.73 **2.4
Type of crisis (Micro)    1.91  1.5 
Initial Gini        -0.06 0.8
Countries excluded  None  KEN, KGZ  Trans, KEN  Trans, KEN  Trans, KEN 
R-squared / NOBS  0.046  41 0.119 39 0.350 24 0.417  24  0.371 24
Adjusted R-squared  -0.031  0.044 0.288 0.329    0.277
S.E.  of  regression  4.1  2.2  2.3  2.3   2.4  
Log  likelihood  75.0   95.3  57.7  59.0   58.1  
** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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 Figure 1: Mexico: Alternative estimates of Gini coefficient in the early-mid 1990s.   
(Source: Table 3) 
 




















 Figure 2:  Gini coefficients in three African counteies duirng the 1990s (Source: Povcal) 
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Figure 3:  Poverty headcount coefficients just before and just after onset of crisis  
(Source: Povcal,  Uses same dates as for Table 1 (c)). 
























Figure 4:  Gini coefficients before any crisis and just after end of crisis  




Figure 5:  Gini coefficients just before and just after onset of crisis  
(Source: Table 1 (a)) 
 





















































Annex:  A closer look at one crisis: Indonesia 
The Indonesian crisis that began in the second half of 1997 and deteriorated rapidly in the months 
following December 1997, is a promising case in which to examine relative impact on different 
groups.  This is not simply because of the depth of the crisis (real GDP declined by 13% in 1998 
and remained unchanged in 1999 before beginning a recovery; the estimated fiscal cost of 55 
percent of GDP equals the highest ever recorded).   But it is also because household level impact 
is unusually well documented.  In particular three extensive Indonesia Family Life Surveys 
(IFLS) are well-timed for analyzing trends in poverty in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
24  
About 2000 households were surveyed in August-December 1997 (IFLS2), just before food 
prices started to increase sharply, and almost all were resurveyed one year later (IFLS2+),  by 
which time nominal food prices had reached a plateau at almost 3 times their pre-crisis level. A 
third wave, IFLS3, was fielded in late 2000.  Another important source, with much larger samples 
but a less detailed questionnaire, is the annual “core” and three-yearly full national SUSENAS 
socio-economic survey.  Rural conditions have also been tracked in a periodic survey of 120 
households in each of 100 villages, conducted 5 times in the period 1997-99. 
 
Unfortunately, the Indonesian surveys do not ask questions on usage of financial services or on 
other aspects that would help us directly identify and track the financial sector channels of 
causality discussed in Section 2.3.
25  As such, timing is the main identifier of the effects of the 
Indonesian crisis, though an alternative, discussed in A.3 below, is to model the impact of certain 
price and other changes on household income and opportunities. 
 
A.1 Short-term  impact 
To summarize, data from late 1998 indicate a large increase in poverty rates, but there may have 
been a reduction in income inequality, although there are some indications of a relatively severe 
welfare impact on the already poor.  However, measuring these changes is highly sensitive to the 
price index used to deflate household income or expenditure data.  With such a wide range of 
estimates of the increase in income poverty, it is prudent to look at non-income indicators also.  
While poor households may have lost a somewhat smaller proportion of their spending power, 
they cut back somewhat more on schooling, especially primary schooling, than did the non-poor.   
 
                                                 
24 Selected major waymarks in the Indonesian crisis are as follows.  August 14, 1997: rupiah peg 
abandoned (followed by heightened pressure on the currency as corporates scramble to cover their FX 
exposure); October 31: IMF $40 billion agreement unveiled; November 1: 16 banks closed leading to bank 
run. December: concerns over Suharto’s health push rupiah and stock market sharply lower – by end-1997 
Rupiah has lost over 58 percent of its value since mid-year.  Moodys downgrades Indonesia sovereign debt 
to Ba1 – a junk rating.  January 6, 1998: announcement of expansionary budget incompatible with IMF 
program; rupiah collapses, losing (again) half of its remaining value over a five-day period (later 
recovering somewhat), food and other prices jump, panic buying reported.  January 27: partial debt 
moratorium announced together with guarantee of depositor funds.  January till mid-February: Food and 
anti-Chinese riots.  May 21: following weeks of riots in which several hundred died, Suharto steps down.  
July 1998: Rupiah weakens sharply again in July, recovering gradually to a new plateau by October.  June 
1999: Parliamentary elections.  It should be noted that the financial crisis was accompanied by a severe 
drought from mid-1997 which helped trigger smog-creating forest fires.  These factors, uninfluenced by the 
financial crisis were associated with a 4% decline in rice output in 1997, and a further 5% decline in 1999.  
Total direct cost of the forest fires to Indonesia has been estimated at 2.5% of GDP (Barber and 
Schweithelm, 2002).  The forest fires also had health impacts. 
25 In this context the reported resilience of Indonesia’s main microfinance lender BRI through the crisis, 
both in terms of microfinance loan loss experience and growth in microdeposits, is intriguing  (Patten et al. 
2001).  A similar pattern was reported for Bolivia (Vogelgesang, 2001). Annex: Indonesia 
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Because of the violent fluctuations in the exchange rate and in internal prices, the appropriate 
deflator is quite uncertain.  Tradable prices, including that of most foodstuffs, generally increased 
more quickly than non-traded.  Frankenberg et al. (1999 - FTB) report results based both on the 
Indonesian Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) urban price series and on the separate price series 
collected as part of the IFLS process.  The IFLS price series suggest higher inflation by about 15 
percentage points, and accordingly imply a much larger increase in poverty.  Both series imply a 
sharp decline in mean and median real per capita consumption expenditure (PCE), by 39% 
(mean) and 21% (median) for the adjusted figures, and by 24% (mean) and 2% (median) for the 
BPS series (FTB, Table 2.1).  The fact that the mean percentage decline is so much higher than 
the median alerts us to disproportionately higher declines at higher deciles and is the first 
indication that income declines are not concentrated among the poor.   Such large percentage 
declines in both mean and median PCE imply sharply rising poverty rates.
26  The IFLS uses a 
national poverty line and reports headcount poverty doubling on the adjusted inflation figures, but 
increasing by only about a third if the official inflation series is used (FTB, Table 2.2).  Suryahadi 
et al. (2003) arrive at a higher set of headcount estimates, but which show a similar rate of 
increase in the headcount from 15% at mid-1997 to 33% at end-1998. (see e.g. their Figure 2). 
 
A separate question is how the already poor have fared during the crisis.  Suryahadi et al.  (2000) 
calculated the change in real expenditures by quintile in two waves of the large SUSENAS 
household budget survey: February 1996 and February 1999.  Real expenditure fell for all 
quintiles, but progressively less for poorer quintiles (6 percent for the bottom compared with 24% 
for the top – their Table 2).  Inequality measures based on these calculations therefore show 
declining inequality in the crisis.
 27 Nevertheless, there are indications that important expenditures 
were relatively severely constrained by those in the lowest quartile.  For instance, secondary 
school (age 13-19) enrolment fell in all deciles, but by more (51 to 45%) in lowest decile 
households than in the rest—though the fall in the second decile (74 to 67% ) is larger in absolute 
numbers and not much less proportionately.  Primary school enrolment also fell, but by a 
statistically significant amount (93% to 88%) only for the lowest decile (FTB, Table 4.1, 4.2). 
  
Patterns of healthcare usage changed sharply during the crisis.  It appears that both relative price 
and quality of public healthcare services deteriorated, and many households substituted private 
suppliers.  But there are indications
28 that the price barrier was too high for lowest income 
households to make this substitution.  Overall decline in usage of public healthcare facilities was 
identified by the researchers as a worrying likely source of future health problems (FTB p. 59).  
However, there is little indication in the data of a deterioration  in self-reported health status, or in 
the relationship of health status to income level (FTB Tables 7.3, 7.4).  The statistically 
significant reductions in the proportion of children with stunting (FTB Table 7.5), limit the extent 
to which the effect of trend improvements in nutrition and healthcare on the condition of the poor 
were immediately interrupted by the crisis.  Nevertheless, the IFLS healthcare professionals 
reported a systematic deterioration in respondents’ overall health status with, apparently, the 
largest deterioration in the lowest income categories (FTB p. 87 and Table 7.11).   
                                                 
26 Declines in median hourly wage rates are larger than those reported for PCEs (, suggesting consumption 
smoothing, though whether this employed savings or borrowing is not known (FTB Table 3.2).  
Participation in paid employment did not change much, but there was a considerable increase in female 
participation in unpaid (family) work. 
27 For the shorter period 1997-8, measuring the immediate impact on the panel of households in IFLS2 and 
2+, Thomas and Frankenberg (2005) report that the top quartile showed the largest percentage declines in 
PCE; the bottom quartile also suffered large percentage declines, with the middle income groups relatively 
unaffected.  As measured by the standard deviation of log PCE, inequality declined. 
28 The relationships here are not all statistically significant (FTB, Table 5.3, 5.4). Annex: Indonesia 
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A.2 Medium-term  impact 
Strauss et al. (2004) brings the story forward by two years to the end of 2000. Strikingly, poverty 
rates appear to have stabilized and even fallen.
29  Using a different poverty line to that employed 
in FTB,
30 Strauss et al estimate (Table 3.1) that the headcount fell from 17.7% in 1997 to 15.9% 
three years later. The difference is not statistically significant given the modest sample size, but 
there was also a fall in each of four age groups in both urban and rural areas.
31   
 
This is a dramatic recovery from the sharp worsening of poverty measured in 1998 (in IFSL2+). 
And it is confirmed by the synthetic set of estimates presented by Suryahadi et al. (2003), who 
estimate that poverty headcount peaked at 33 percent in November 1998, before falling back to 
15% by August 2000 and to 10% by February 2001 (13% in February 2002).  A fall in the share 
taken by rice in household budgets is another indicator of improved conditions between 1997 and 
2000 (Strauss et al. Table 3.2).  
 
Furthermore, plotting the cdf of personal consumer expenditure for 1997 and 2000, it becomes 
evident that the incidence of poverty has fallen for almost any chosen poverty line (up to a 
multiple of any standard poverty lines).
32  However, the 2000 cdf does not dominate the 1997 one 
everywhere – certain middle-income groups saw a reduction in real living standards between the 
two periods.  From this data, two years after the crisis, it would be hard to argue that the poor had 
been particularly badly hit in living standards.  
 
Interestingly, more households reported a perceived deterioration in standard of living since 1997 
than reported an improvement.  But this is not because of perceived deterioration at the bottom: 
only one in twenty of those who reported themselves as being in the second-from bottom 
category had slipped to the bottom category by 2000.  (In contrast, three of every four persons 
who reported themselves as having been in the second-from top category in 1997 had slipped at 
least one notch by 2000.)  From this perspective too, therefore, it seems that living standard 
declines between 1997 and 2000 were not particularly concentrated among the poor (Strauss et 
al., Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
 
There were sizable declines in median real wages in the private sector and overall (median public 
sector wages actually increased).
33  The declines were smaller than those reported for 1997-98, 
suggesting a recovery.  On the other hand, there was a sharp increase in rates of employment, 
especially among women and younger men and applying both to paid and unpaid employment.  
Thus real wages had fallen, but household incomes had been maintained through more work, 
often through adding an additional part-time job (Strauss et al., Table 5.1). 
 
A similar story is suggested by the 2000 data on educational enrolment.  Enrolment was generally 
up, having recovered all of the initial loss in 1998, and by a statistically significant amount in the 
                                                 
29 Suryahadi et al., using different surveys, arrived at the conclusion that poverty peaked around August 
1998 (Table 7) 
30 The poverty lines used by FTB and by Strauss et al. are not a single rupiah figure across Indonesia, but 
instead are set at a multiple of the local cost of a standard national food basket.   
31 Classifying households into urban and rural and by region, 19 different headcount figures are obtained, of 
which 13 show declined, two statistically significant.  Only rural households in West Nusa Tenggara 
(Lombok and Sumbawa islands) shows a significant increase.  Much the same pattern is observed for the 
poverty gap and squared poverty gap (Strauss et al. Tables 3.5).  
32 And the difference is statistically significant at least up to standard poverty lines.  (Strauss et al. Figures 
3.1, 3.2). 
33 Indeed, the cdf of overall employee hourly real wage rates was uniformly lower in 2000 than in 1997.  
Self-employment increased and the cdf of hourly earnings of the self-employed rose. Annex: Indonesia 
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case of poor primary school age (7-12) children (Strauss et al. Table 6.1).  The recovery in 
enrolment is confirmed in the May 1999 wave of the 100-villages survey, which also documents a 
lower incidence by then of child labor (Cameron, 2000). 
  
Height for age and weight for age cumulative distribution functions also seem to show 
improvements at the left-tail in 2000 relative to 1997.  The proportion of children in different age 
groups showing up in the unfavorable tail of a standardized distribution of these variables 
generally declines and for amounts that are statistically significant for the older children (36-59 
months) (Strauss et al. Table 7.1).  Only in respect of weight for height and for very young girls 
(3-17 months) is there an adverse movement that even approaches statistical significance (Strauss 
et al. Table 7.3).  However, and importantly, self-reported and expert-reported health conditions 
of children appear to have deteriorated significantly; however, the deterioration is not 
significantly associated with income/expenditure levels (Strauss et al. Table 7.6).  The lower use 
of some types of public health facility by poor children persisted to 2000; but the fact that health 
status had not been affected induced some analysts to question the effectiveness of these facilities 
(Strauss et al. p. 258). 
 
Of course, even if there was an improvement in conditions in 2000 relative to 1997, that does not 
imply that the effects of the crisis had been completely eliminated by then.  The steady 
improvements of previous decades had been interrupted, and the current state was evidently lower 
than a projection of previous trends.  
 
A.3  An alternative view of the Indonesia crisis: simulating a micro-macro model 
One clear drawback of the before-and-after approach to judging the impact of the crisis is that it 
neither decomposes the impacts of different elements of the crisis – devaluation, relative price 
change, credit constraints, etc., nor does it cleanly abstract from other exogenous developments, 
such as the drought.  Robilliard et al. (2002) present a sophisticated analysis along these lines 
using a 38-sector CGE model of the economy linked to a 10,000 household microsimulation 
model calibrated on the 1996 SUSENAS survey.
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Strikingly, these authors argue that income inequality (Gini) was increased by the crisis – albeit 
only slightly in aggregate (larger increases in rural than in urban inequality being offset by a 
narrowing of the urban-rural gap).  Working through the modeled effect of observed price 
changes in the period 1997-98 on household incomes they simulate an increase in inequality.  
The model sees the credit crunch in particular as factors that would have worked to increase 
inequality.  The contrast between this simulation and what was apparently a decline in the 
estimated Gini coefficient from surveys taken before and the crisis must then be interpreted as 
reflecting either (i) a degree of adaptability, not captured in the model, of poorer Indonesian 
households and the markets in which they operate to the wage-price and other shocks, or (ii) other 
non-crisis factors working to offset the modeled increase in Gini.  
                                                 
34 Adopting a narrower focus, but again avoiding reliance on the possible sampling error introduced by 
comparing before and after household surveys, Levinsohn et al. (1999) simply look at price changes and 
how they differentially impacted poor and non-poor at their initial basket of goods.  Their approach is to 
calculate a Laspeyre’s price index for January 1997 and October 1998 for the consumption basket of each 
of 58,000 households sampled in the SUSENAS survey of 1993.  The urban and rural results prove to be 
quite different.  Taking account of owner-occupied housing and self-produced food consumption, the rural 
poor (bottom decile) experienced a price increase of  73%, compared with 84% for the rural rich.  But in 
the urban poor saw a price increase of 128%, compared with only 89% for the urban rich.  The 
compensating variations calculated on 1996 SUSENAS data by Berry and Levinsohn (1999), and including 
an allowance for product substitution based on Deaton’s (1997) methodology, yield much lower costs, but 
distributionally similar results.  The data source here does, however, not provide income information. 